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Serbia 2000-2008: a changing political
culture?
Ivana Spasić
 
Introduction
1 The aim of this paper1 is to indicate some trends in the changing political culture in
Serbia from the point of view of ordinary citizens. Discussions of political and economic
transitions in Eastern Europe have tended to privilege the top-down approach, presenting
general  outlines  and  macro-processes.  This  paper  on  the  contrary  starts  from  the
assumption that this must be complemented by a more bottom-up, fine-grained view that
takes seriously what ordinary people think and say about what is going on. The choice is
methodological and does not imply that what citizens think is necessarily "correct" in
cognitive or moral terms. There is just the belief that, in a democracy, the real, living
people, with all their virtues and vices, must be taken into account since they are the true
basis of any political processes and the source of their legitimacy.
2 The main database  I  draw on has  been collected by  the  long-term qualitative  study
"Politics and everyday life". This project, conducted in three successive waves between
2002 and 2007, applied the method of semi-structured interviews and centered on topics
of  political  transition  and  social  transformation  in  Serbia.  The  idea  was  to  look  for
connections  between  people's  everyday  life  and  their  evaluations  of  the  political
developments in the Serbian society. Ordinary people of different backgrounds and living
in different places were interviewed.2 The project was not a true panel study, since not
exactly the same people were interviewed (although there are a handful of them who
took part in all three stages). The sample varied in size and composition following the
slightly different objectives of the three studies, and the topics included in the interview
guide were not identical. The most important difference in the character of the sample,
apart from its size, was that in the first study both politically active and passive citizens
were targeted, both supporters and opponents of the change of regime in 2000, while in
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the other two studies this provision was not strictly applied, the result being a slight
overrepresentation  of  respondents  with  a  pro-democratic  orientation.  In  terms  of
breadth, the first study broached the largest number of issues, while in 2007 we focused
specifically on electoral abstention. For all these methodological reasons, the findings are
not strictly comparable, but there are trends which, with all the necessary caution, can be
roughly traced and followed through all three stages.
3 In  addition  to  these  data  I  will  use  other  sources  as  well,  mainly  quantitative  and
"objective", like election results, public opinion polls etc. Comparisons of this sort can be
very helpful in reconstructing whether and how the political culture of Serbian citizens
has been evolving over the past eight years.
4 One more note is in order at the very beginning: I will not discuss at all the issue of
Kosovo and the huge impact Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008
has had on Serbian politics, because I am basing my analysis on data collected well before
the event. Moreover, the question is too complex to be dealt with summarily.
 
The "Great Shift": 2002 Findings 
5 Let me first summarize briefly the main findings of our first study, since they will be used
as the baseline against which to assess the developments in the meantime. The 2002
interviews showed that attitudes of Serbian citizens toward politics in general, political
change of 2000, new post-Milošević government and the problems Serbia was facing were
marked by a positive change as compared with the kind of political behavior (most) Serbs
had engaged in during late 1980s and early 1990s. In our first publication we called this
shift "New Realism" and found its manifestations in increased prominence of elements
such as rational reasoning, down-to-earthness, tolerance, moderation etc. 
6 The first and most obvious corroboration is provided by the very events of October 5,
2000: hadn't Serbian citizens changed, they would not have been capable of staging such a
massive  yet  disciplined protest,  and probably  would not  have  succeeded in  toppling
Milošević. Not surprisingly, this event occupied central place in 2002 interviews, and the
way people described it provided a focal point for articulating the new political values.
The "meanings of October 5" extracted from respondents' accounts may be summarized
as follows: 1) It was a historical event and a turning point in recent Serbian history; 2) The
victory was won by the joint struggle of united citizens; 3) It marks the beginning of a
radical change in all aspects of life – "we must build our common house anew", as dozens
of them put it; 4) This was popular defense of one's right to vote freely – votes are sacred
in a democracy; 5) Risks were high but people went out anyway, because they could not
be intimidated any more. It is important to stress that this characterization of "October
5"  was  basically  the  same  across  political  groupings  –  even  those  who  in  principle
opposed the political change were ready to concede this set of features to the event itself
and fundamentally accepted its consequences (as inevitable, if not desirable). We shall see
how this, too changed in later years.
7 At that initial moment of the post-Milošević era, citizens had quite distinct ideas about
what the new government had to do first. These ideas apart from substantive contents
also  included  a  strong  normative  component,  and  so  may  be  called  "normative
expectations": 
• 1. Economic recovery: more jobs, higher pay, better living standards; 
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• 2. Equality before the law and legal security: no impunity for anyone, a functioning legal
system, protection of rights;
• 3. Institutional rules: eliminating corruption, general regularization of procedures in state
institutions; 
• 4. Depoliticization of life chances: political memberships, preferences or activities must
not influence a person's non-political well-being (as it had been customary all the time since
1945);
• 5. Caring for the common good instead of partisanship.
8 Finally, here is a list of integral elements of "New Realism" along with two accompanying
shifts in attitudes to the political sphere: 
9 1. New Realism
• - rationality: when assessing a situation, one has to be reasonable, take into account the
objective circumstances and weigh the possibilities;
• - rejection of war as a means to achieve political goals: war must be avoided, negotiations
are always better no matter how difficult the problem;  
• - suspicion of "fast and easy" solutions, premium on pragmatism and compromise: lasting
solutions are hard and slow to come by, one has to be patient; 
• - normal life as politicians’ mandate: those in power ought not to fulfill grand missions, but
simply to provide conditions so that people can live normally 
• - openness to the world: Serbia must never be isolated again 
10 2.  Democratic  threshold:  government  is  accountable  to  the  voters  (not  God-given),
changeable (not there forever), and changed by popular vote (not by force)
11 3. Ambivalence of the political: the ambiguous valences ascribed to the political sphere
• - bad politics/good politics: politics is devil’s business and decent people should avoid it
any price; "good" politics also exists (it means making responsible and wise decisions
determining the course a society takes) but not in Serbia – maybe not anywhere actually...
• - the paradox of (non)involvement: politics is dirty, parties are trash, I want them out of
my life but we, the people must remain involved in order to control the government.
12 We argued in our first study that the events of 2000 were due to a process of social
learning,  whose subject  was the Serbian polity.  As  a  political  community,  citizens of
Serbia had taken some lessons from the bitter experience of the 1990s, and were putting
these lessons – an ‘emergent political culture' – to practice. We also argued that these
changes in political outlook could serve to preclude a possible reverting to the past. The
1990s would never return again. People have developed a strong suspicion, perhaps even
a sort of immunity, to demagogic and populist appeals. They had learned the hard way
what their price was.
13 However, what happened in Serbia since that time seems to have taken a very different
direction. Most of the events after 2002, including political behavior of citizens at some
critical  junctures,  seem  to  prove  our  whole  analysis  wrong  –  overly  optimistic  and
misplaced. What I will try to do in the rest of this article is to defend at least some of our
previous conclusions. I believe that at least some of our arguments are still valid, but
provided they are placed in a context. I wish to look at the period after 2002 at two levels
simultaneously – the level  of  political  actors,  to see what of  the citizens'  "normative
expectations" they have accomplished, and the level of citizens' attitudes and conduct, to
see what parts of the emergent political culture have been preserved.
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The Mixed Destiny of Collective Lessons 
14 The collective lesson that has undoubtedly survived into 2005 and 2007 is the democratic
threshold -  the idea of changeability of government through elections.  Elections and
voting have become thoroughly normalized. Hardly anyone questions their necessity or
democratic capacity anymore. The normal life demanded from politicians (subpoint of
New realism) survived too: a government's value is steadily measured in rational terms,
by the visible and tangible results it has produced. What counts is the performance, the
efficiency demonstrated by holders of executive offices, and not their personality traits,
charisma, or ideological congeniality, as it had been quite usual before.
15 Such positive developments were reinforced by some new points that have emerged in
the later studies. One of these is acceptance of political pluralism (obviously related to
the democratic threshold). This mood, increasingly prominent through 2005 and 2007, is
most easily measured negatively – by the declining frequency of expressed aversions to
the political system based on free competition among different political parties.3 Another
new point is emotional defusing of the way people talked about politics. This was to be
expected, as euphoria naturally subsides with time. This is in turn connected with new
realism, since it implies less passion and less ideology in people's political judgments, to
the benefit of normal life and performance as expected from officials. 
16 Another interesting point was also increasingly felt in the later studies: individualism.
The impression is that more and more often people assume self-consciously (though not
always gladly) the attitude of "minding their own business", taking care of themselves
and  their  families,  instead  of  waging  historical  wars  for  some  larger-than-life  goals
(betterment  of  the  nation,  improvement  of  democracy,  national  pride,  etc.).
Concentrating  their  energies  on  their  self-growth  and  small-scale  interests  may  be
discounted  as  unwelcome  "privatization",  but  it  may  also  be  interpreted  as  healthy
development of an individualistic stance, so much missing from the Serbian historical and
cultural tradition.
17 Unlike the foregoing "collective lessons" that have more or less survived, many more of
them  have  become  quite  shaky  –  if  not  totally  destroyed,  then  certainly  seriously
threatened.  The  most  obvious  candidates  are  rationality,  rejection  of  war  and
suspicion of fast solutions. All of them seem to be thoroughly refuted by the revival of
the ancien regime political forces more specifically, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). For,
everything about the SRS – from the values it  promotes to its  records in power and
outside  of  it  to  the  public  manners  of  its  officials  –  is  the  direct  opposite  of  these
"collective lessons" as we identified them. So if the citizenry really took these lessons, as
we claimed, how is SRS's success to be explained? 
18 From its  near-disappearance  in  2000,  the  SRS  returned to  the  political  scene  and is
continuously improving its ratings in elections and public opinion polls. For the first time
it emerged as the strongest single party in parliamentary elections of December 2003.
 
Table 1. Parliamentary elections 2003
G17 PLUS 11.46
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SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY (SRS) 27.61
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA (DSS) 17.72
DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE 2.20 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DS) 12.58
SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT/NEW SERBIA 7.66 
OTPOR 1.63 
FOR PEOPLE'S UNITY 1.79 
SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA (SPS) 7.61 
INDEPENDENT SERBIA (Vladan Batić) 1.18 
TOGETHER FOR TOLERANCE (Nenad Čanak) 4.22 
YUGOSLAV LEFT (JUL) 0.09 
Source: Statistical Ofﬁce of the Republic of Serbia, 
http://webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/Izbori/izbori1.php?ind=1
19 In this table, parties winning below 1% are omitted, with the exception of the Yugoslav
Left – the once all-powerful party of Milošević's wife. This is meant to illustrate the fact
that not all  ancien regime parties experienced a renaissance: as may be seen, JUL was
virtually wiped out, while SRS soared. 
20 Next  year,  in  presidential  elections,  SRS  candidate  Tomislav  Nikolić  entered  second
round, to be defeated, by not too great a margin, by the Democrat Boris Tadić (53.24 % :
45.40 %).  The trend continued in 2007 parliamentary elections,  when SRS fared even
better than in 2003 – 28.6 % of votes and 81 seat in the National Assembly, that is 17 seats
more than the next strongest party, the Democratic Party (DS). The parties of the so-
called "democratic bloc" however managed, after long months of difficult negotiations
seasoned with fights and scandals, to agree on a majority cabinet that excluded the SRS.
(This government fell in March 2008 on the Kosovo problem, but that is another story.)
Finally,  the  repeated contest  between  the  same  rivals  in  February  2008  presidential
elections was even more uncertain to the very end (first round: Nikolić 39.99 % : Tadić
35.39 %; second round Tadić 50.5 % : Nikolić 47.3 %). 
21 My  suggestion  here  is  that  the  renewed  attraction  of  SRS  may  not  necessarily  be
interpreted as a collapse of all the improvements and "collective lessons" identified in the
early  2000s:  perhaps  unfortunately,  the  SRS  has  profited  from  some  aspects  of  the
transformation of Serbian political culture. The newly found rationality of the Serbian
electorate  which is  a  guarantee  of  its  democratic  future  has  also  contributed to  the
success of the Radicals – partly because this rationality is itself insufficiently stabilized,
and partly due to the unfavorable objective constellation. I will try to substantiate this
claim in the following sections.
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22 To begin with, the current support to SRS is not of the same kind as the mass craze
centered on Milošević in the late 1980s, the infamous "anti-bureaucratic revolution" as
his ideologues named it, which was hotly emotional, passionate, and ideological – in a
word, irrational. Though the two phenomena may share some of the same sources (like
similar  values,  worldviews,  and  cultural  moods),  in  SRS  followers  one  does  not  see
deluded people, tricked into believing everything they are told by a collection of bizarre,
megalomaniac figures. The support to SRS is more interested-based and interest-driven,
more "down to earth", and therefore more "rational", if we take this word in its most
elementary sense of weighting one's chances and having articulable reasons for what one
does i.e. chooses.
23 For illustration,  take the correlation of party preference and replies to the following
question  in  a  survey:  Taking  into  account life  as  a  whole,  would  you  say  you  have  been
predominantly a winner, a loser, or a little of both? The distribution of "winners" and "losers"
according to political parties the respondents like clearly shows how political orientation
depends on the subjective experience of transition. 
 
Table 2. Experience of being a loser and party preference
  Winner Loser Both Total
DS 27 15 58 100
SRS 4 47 49 100
No preference 8 29 63 100
Average 12 30 58 100
Source: Mihailović 2006: 61
24 From the figures it is clear that SRS base is located mostly among the so-called transition
losers. These  people  believe  (quite  realistically)  that,  given  their  unfavorable  profile
(advanced age, lower education, rural residence...), their chances in an open capitalist
competition are rather slim. So they opt for a corporative,  nationalist  state that will
protect them – for a closed economy and egalitarianism promised by the SRS. 
25 The correlation becomes even more striking if to this personal pessimism we add the
experience of total, collective loss, operationalized by the question: Taking into account all
that has been going on over the past 4-5 years, do you see our country as a winner, a loser, or a
little of both?  The following table presents correlations of the "combined loss index" with
attitudes to democracy (respondents answering "Agree" to the listed statements):
 
Table 3. Experience of general loss and attitudes to democracy
  winner loser both don’t
know
Democracy is better than any other form of government 77 30 45 18
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For  people  like  me,  democratic  and  undemocratic  regimes
are the same
8 17 14 10
Sometimes  an  undemocratic  government  is  better  than  a
democratic one
7 30 18 13
Don’t know 8 23 23 59
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Stoiljković 2007: 29
26 While the above measures are subjective (respondents themselves decided whether they
are classified as winners or losers) the connection between SRS vote and being located on
the lower rungs of  the social  ladder is  also visible if  we use objective variables,  like
education:
 
Table 4.Education and announced vote in presidential elections 2008, 2nd round
  Nikolić Tadić Average
Elementary school 27% 16% 24%
Trade school 17% 7% 11%
Secondary school 45% 52% 48%
College or university 11% 25% 17%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: CeSID, January 2008
27 To conclude: subjective "winners", the better educated, and respondents who see their
family's standard of living as "fair" to "middle" opt predominantly for democratic parties.
The latter thus tend to politically represent the "winners", and the former the "losers".
The correlations are quite high, especially with the combined "loss index"4.
28 The message of these figures is clear: the greater the number of people who feel they are
profiting from the current social  transformation,  the firmer the democracy.  In other
words, without rapid and powerful economic improvement democracy in Serbia is not
likely to be stabilized soon. This is not the only condition, but it is a major one. 
29 Further support to the claim that current popularity of the SRS has rational grounds may
be obtained if we concentrate on the trajectory of the normal life component of the new
realism collective  lesson from 2002,  and  the  concomitant  performance criteria for
assessing politicians in power. These lessons have survived: in our 2005 and 2007 studies
this way of judging the authorities at all levels of government was ever more prominent,
even becoming routinized. Yet here this gain for a new political culture acts as a double-
edged sword. Let us first make a detour through the way people listed societal priorities,
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that is, the most important things that ought to be achieved in Serbia. The questionnaire
item was: Which aspirations and goals should be achieved in order for Serbia to become a society
you would like to live in? Choose three and rank them.
 
Table 5. Priorities for Serbia in the opinion of citizens
.  % 2003 Rank 2003 % 2005 Rank 2005
Decent living standards 57 1 63 1
Good employment opportunities 42 2 46 2
Minimum crime and corruption 36 4 41 3
Rule of law 40 3 37 4
Political stability 26 6 35 5
Successful economy 33 5 33 6
Well functioning democracy 14 7 14 7
Social justice 14 8 13 8
Accomplishment of national goals 6 9 7 9
Source: Mihailović 2006: 59
30 We can see how the effect of the performance criteria is double-edged: on one hand, it is
undoubtedly positive that citizens have gotten used to applying the measure of efficiency
to evaluate political figures; this is a sign of a more rational (should I say more "Western-
like"...) political culture. But on the other hand, it is only the democratic parties that have
been in power after 2000; in this way they were exposed to being judged by the electorate
along these lines. And the dissatisfaction with the results they achieved – which, though
not negligible, are certainly not fantastic – makes many people turn to the SRS reasoning
that, maybe, the SRS would "do better".5
31 One more detail is interesting to note in Table 5: the low rating of "Accomplishment of
national goals". It may seem bizarre that in the (presumably) very nationalistic Serbian
public opinion this collective goal was twice ranked the last and got just 6-7 percent of
support. This change of mood amongst the Serbian electorate has been registered for
some years and, of course, the SRS strategists know it very well. So it is not accidental
that this party has lately taken  pains to "polish" its public image, to soften its rhetoric,
and to shift the accent from national to social topics. Thus for a couple of years already
the  SRS  is  insisting  on  pro-social  security,  anti-privatization,  anti-globalist  and
egalitarian  messages.  Though  not  left  out  of  course,  chauvinism  is  no  longer
foregrounded in their public image.
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The disenchantment: was it inevitable? 
32 Unlike the optimistic,  sometimes euphoric mood that dominated our first  interviews,
what prevailed in 2005 and, especially, 2007 is the gloomy tone of disappointment and
disillusionment.  When talking about how they felt, and how people around them felt,
interviewees said that hopes were dashed, that there was nothing to be expected any
more. In 2002 people were saying they knew that change could not happen overnight and
that they were ready to wait for life to get better in Serbia. Three years later, they were
still in principle patient, though stating that they no longer knew how much longer this
improvement  would  take.  And  in  2007,  they  stopped  waiting  altogether:  there  was
nothing to wait for, they said. Or, as Golubović6 summarized it: until 2005, people were
dissatisfied with the pace of changes; from 2005 on, they are no longer sure as to the
direction  of  changes.  In  the  beginning,  they  used  to  say  "it's  generally  OK,  but  the
government could do things more quickly"; later on, this was replaced by fundamental
doubt: "I'm not sure where Serbia is going".7
33 Disenchantment was routinely registered in all post-communist countries, after the brief
period of initial euphoria. But is it perhaps specific in Serbia? Is it more intense, or in
some other ways different? What are its primary causes?
34 To  begin  with,  some  of  people's  normative  expectations listed  above  remained
unfulfilled. First, economic recovery did not really take place, or at least not to the extent
most people deemed necessary8.  It  could be argued that in economic matters actors'
performance is strongly dependent on objective circumstances, and the Serbian economic
policy makers faced a very unfavorable situation indeed, having to distribute extremely
scarce resources to many equally deserving priorities. 
35 But economy is not the whole story and many things that could have been done at little
or no cost,  were not achieved,  or not completely.  Most of  these concern the strictly
political sphere and the conduct of political actors. Let us see what happened with the
demand for depoliticization of life chances. While an individual's political orientation
no longer brings direct risks to life and limb – as it did under Milošević – Serbia is still
much of a "party-state", only pluralized. Party membership is crucial for appointments,
often even for getting a simple job or some other benefit. Political parties, interviewees
say, do not represent actually existing social groups or identifiable ideological positions
but on the contrary try to divide up the society in accordance with their own pursuits.
They develop clientelism: instead of breaking once and for all with Milošević's practice of
choosing people  for  political  offices  at  all  levels  of  government  and in  government-
controlled enterprises on the basis of political obedience and personal loyalty rather than
expertise and capability,  the democratic  parties  have continued doing just  the same.
Within the parties,  one cannot speak one's  own mind – uncritical  false unanimity is
fostered instead of critical reflection and individual integrity. 
36 The  overcrowded  and  chaotic  character  of  the  Serbian  party  scene  is  confirmed  by
various data. One measurement of party positionings yielded a telling distribution along
the Left-Right dimension: this distinction is shown to be virtually inapplicable here, since
literally all parties are found at all positions, from Extreme Left to Extreme Right. The
differences are just  in percentages –  and even they are not  very large9.  In our 2005
interviews, respondents often presented a reasonable and argued criticism of the existing
political offer, pointing out that it was not clear at all which party stands for what kind of
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policy or values; who is a natural ally of whom, and who supports whom. The respondents
called for a "clearing up" of the party scene, where like-minded parties would be grouped
in recognizable blocs.10
37 The generalized criticism and rejection of the totality of the political sphere (political
leaders, parties, parliament, government bodies...) sharpened over time in our interviews.
After a certain rapprochement between "ordinary people" and "politicians", as a result of
the joint struggle in 2000, the gap soon widened again. The aversion to politics has lead
either  into  utter  passivization,  or  into  bitter  resentment  (To  the  issue  of  personal
involvement I will return below.) But ironically, the individualism noted above as one of
the new motifs appearing in the later studies arises precisely in connection with this
depressed mood. As people stopped believing political change would make any sensible
positive impact in their  lives,  they started to look away from the political  sphere at
themselves and their small private worlds, searching them for possible strengths and
assets. That is increasingly their choice, although they might not be very convinced it will
work. Whether from the general perspective of democracy in Serbia this is more of a
"negative" or a "positive" development, is difficult to judge.
38 The next  extremely important  expectation that  has  been betrayed is  caring for the
common good.  Against  the backdrop of  citizens'  emphatic belief  that,  after the new
beginning of October 2000, everybody had to contribute to the benefit of the community
(cf. "building our common house anew"), the behavior of political parties stands out in
sharp contrast.  For,  they  acted in  exactly  the  opposite  way,  engaging in  continuous
mutual  quarrels  and  conflicts,  never  putting  particularistic  differences  and  interests
behind the interests of all. Unashamed partisanship played out in various public arenas,
from the parliament to the media,  disgusted the citizens (once again).  A remarkable
instance of the political elite's inability to operationalize the common interest is their
failure  to  agree  upon  a  new  Constitution  until  October  2006.  This  indicates  their
unwillingness  to  take  seriously  the  institutionalization  of  democracy  and  their
detrimental disregard for the chances provided by the moment of symbolic hegemony of
the "democratic side" in the immediate aftermath of October 5.11
39 However, as already noted in relation with growing individualism, such developments
often carry ambiguous potentials. What is destructive from one point of view may hold
out a promise from another. So despite the bleak picture of life in Serbia our interviewees
were describing in 2005 and 2007, what slowly emerged in the background was a sort of
state  and  social  system  that,  very  gradually  and  very  insecurely,  was  beginning  to
function.  This institutional  infrastructure that was being put together piece by piece
might not meet anybody's expectations in terms of performance and quality of services,
but  still,  it  'worked' in a  way.  Though the respondents  criticized much of  what  this
system was doing, these very criticisms were an indirect proof that there was something
to  criticize  in  the  first  place.  In  2005  I  termed  this  paradoxical  situation  "low
normalization", to denote the inchoate sense that Serbia was slowly becoming something
of a "normal" society. The depth of disappointment expressed by our interviewees was
proportionate to the unrealistically high hopes they had invested in the "new beginning"
of 2000; but these in turn, with their strong emotions and the feeling of total freedom in
choosing  the  collective  future  (building  our  common  house  anew)  had  its  price.
Everything seemed possible just because everything had been ruined.
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Disengagmenet and electoral abstention
40 A consequence of all these processes has been the extremely low esteem that political
parties, political figures and the whole political system enjoy in the eyes of citizens. The
strong rejection of the party system has also resulted in declining rates of voter turnout
from one election to another. Shrinking electoral participation has become a concern in
recent years, especially in the "democratic camp". Various actions have been undertaken
to,  first,  study  the  phenomenon and,  secondly,  to  reverse  the  trend 12.  The  issue  is
complex  however.  Here  objective  facts  mingle  with  political  fears.  For  one  thing,
abstention has actually not been so high as was believed. CeSID data measuring voter
turnout show a vacillating line, not at all unlike what one finds in other countries. It has
ranged around 50-60%, with quite explicable lows (under 40 % in failed presidentials in
2003) and highs (the decisive elections of 2000)13. Moreover, even these percentages must
be corrected upwards, because the official electorate, for various technical reasons, is
significantly larger than realistic.14
41 What actually caused concern was an indication consistently emerging from studies since
the late 1990s, that in addition to "structural" or "sociological" abstainers (those who are
too sick, too old, too poor, and generally too socially alienated to vote) there was also the
other  kind  –  a  significant  part  of  the  younger,  urban  and  relatively  well  educated
electorate tending to the democratic option that didn't vote, thereby contributing to the
good score of the SRS. The reasons were located within these young people's general
apathy and/or dissatisfaction with the behavior of democratic parties. One of the first
students of the phenomenon coined the phrase "abstainers against the façade democracy"
and interpreted this  kind of  abstention not  as  a  sign of  political  apathy but  on the
contrary of the critical stance aimed at the way the existing parties operationalized the
democratic option15. Although of course this group does not comprise all the abstainers,
their numerical share is obviously not negligible since their attitudes color significantly
the general picture of the whole category of abstainers. For instance, one poll has found
clear  divergences  in terms of  values  between abstainers  (in general)  and voters:  the
former had a more marked democratic and pro-European attitude than the latter, but at
the same time were more disheartened and more pessimistic.16
42 The 2008 presidential elections seemed to refute the growing apathy hypothesis: turnout
was well over 60 % (and even higher, in real terms). But this fits very well in what our
2007 interviewees told us: they said they would give up their abstention if the vote was
clearly decisive. Obviously, these presidential elections, especially their second round,
were felt to be just that – an occasion when Serbia was choosing its future, between two
distinct and opposed options. Moreover, there is some indication that the belief in more
frequent  abstention  of  young,  democratically  minded  people  hadn't  been  totally
unfounded: the turnout was considerably higher, and Tadić's score as well, in the second
round. 
43 This whole discussion is meant to point to a paradoxical situation concerning political
participation in Serbia at this moment. This "paradox of (non)involvement" affects both
citizens-voters and the analyst. On one hand, distancing and disengagement from politics
are an individual right, a legitimate personal choice and, as such, an important element of
a liberal democracy. After all, it was an important component of the "normality" people
were fighting for on October 5, 2000: one of the most frequently repeated statements in
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our 2002 study was that people wanted to get rid of politics,  to chase it out of their
everyday life. Yet on the other hand, they question is, can we afford it yet? Isn't such an
attitude a sort of luxury in today's Serbia, when not even the most fundamental issues
have been resolved? Aren't the consequences of citizens' disaffection and withdrawal into
privacy too serious? 
44 Back in 2002, reflecting on this strongly expressed desire of citizens to be let alone by
politics, we predicted that this attitude, in combination with an equally strong desire to
keep an eye on state officials lest they become abusers like Milošević, would produce an
unresolvable tension and contribute to backlashes in the process of democratization. This
is precisely what happened. And the tension could have been reduced, if political leaders
had taken more care to maintain the relations of mutual respect with citizens established
through joint struggle in 2000. I return to this question in the closing section.
45 To conclude on the paradox of (non)involvement and its analytical consequences: for the
analyst,  it  is  manifested most  pointedly  in the dilemma of  how to evaluate  citizens'
critique of "politics".  Is there a way to distinguish between rational and constructive
criticism put forward by committed but individualistic citizens aware of their rights, on
one  side,  and  desperate,  indiscriminately  negative  attitudes  of  angry  but  politically
passive people, on the other? The former leads to democracy, at least in the long run; the
latter to apathy, possibly seasoned with occasional bursts of violence, like in February
2008. 
 
The inadequacies of the political system
46 There is an additional source that helps explain the attractiveness of SRS in more or less
rational terms: the inadequacies of the Serbian party scene. It has often been noted that a
genuine social democratic option is missing. This may seem strange, since post-socialist
transition structurally demands and produces this political supply, but on the other hand
it is not strange at all, since in most other post-socialist countries this place is occupied
by the reformed communists, while in Serbia the communists never underwent any true
reform,  they  just  changed  the  party  name.  But  what  is  almost  never  is  that  the
conservative option is equally missing – conservative in the conventional European sense
of  center-right,  voelkisch  politics,  like  the  German  Christian  Democrats,  French
conservatives or, closer to home, HDZ in Croatia after 2000. Among Serbian parties, it is
Koštunica's DSS that is best suited for this role. And they do play it to some extent, but
the extent is really quite modest. The DSS hasn't grown into a respectable party with a
clear profile, remaining instead a fuzzy catch-all which appeals to everybody and nobody
in  particular.  It  lacks  a  developed infrastructure  and virtually  any  recognizable  and
strong  personalities  apart  from  Koštunica  himself.17  There  are,  I  believe,  sizeable
segments of the Serbian population who would, "naturally" as it were, tend to this party –
elderly, traditionalist people, a bit slow and outmoded, with a strong national feeling but
not fascist or openly authoritarian. Yet this segment of the electorate has not become
attached to the DSS on a continuous basis; the party has not won their loyalty and the
vote it gets is incidental and unstable. In the absence of sufficient pulls from DSS, most of
these voters are likely to end up voting SRS.18
47 And finally, there is the issue of symbolic institutionalization of "October 5". How can we
explain the fact that today, seven years after the event, it is possible to claim in public –
as  the  SRS  is  doing  –  that  all  evils  in  Serbia  started  in  2000:  from  poverty  and
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unemployment to hurt national pride and international powerlessness? That is, how is it
possible  to  find  people  to  believe  it?  And  how  come  many  among  these  believers
themselves participated in the people's revolution of 2000? The answer lies in the neglect
of the symbolic aspect of politics amongst the democratic forces. The "October 5" should
have been institutionalized into a sort of new national holiday – if not literally, then at
least figuratively; it could be remembered as a great date in recent Serbian history when
citizens  undertook  their  own  collective  political  subjectivation.  This  symbolic
crystallization could have channeled a portion of popular emotional energies away from
celebrating aggressive nationalist symbols into celebrating democracy. This opportunity
was not  taken,  and "October 5" was almost  immediately vulgarized and devalued by
quarrels  and mutual  accusations of  the democratic  leaders.  Hence it  did not  become
forever fixed as a rupture between a "before" and an "after". The way was opened for
later  radical  reinterpretations  of  what  seemed  to  be  clear  to  everybody  –  that  the
Milošević era was one of the worst periods in modern Serbian history. In our interviews,
this process is also reflected, in the changing way our respondents talk about "October 5":
in 2002, it was a historical date, the new dawn for Serbia etc. In 2005, it began to pale and
sink down into the indistinguishable morass of "politics".  In 2007, its mention makes
people angry rather than proud, because they feel it to be the symbol of failed hopes and
cheated promises. 
 
Conclusion
48 So, is the Serbian political culture changing? Is it becoming more democratic, tolerant,
reasonable?  The  answer  depends  on  how  much  weight  we  ascribe  to  this  variable.
Political  culture  in  its  broad  sense  of  diffuse  sentiment,  set  of  attitudes  (never
homogeneous) and symbolic patterns (not necessarily coherent) related to the definition
and making of politics, is definitely changing. Yet it cannot stand on its own, without the
support of an equally changing political structure of society. The evolving political culture
needs to rely on a set of ever more stabilized institutions that serve as a framework for
"doing politics" in ways different than before, in accordance with new, post-authoritarian
rules. This other, objective and systemic side of the transformation of Serbian politics has
played its part less well. Ordinary people have been, so to say, left alone to democratize
their political outlook as best they can. 
49 It is especially the democratically oriented citizens of Serbia that have been let down by
"their"  political  representatives,  the parties  of  the democratic  bloc.  The nationalists,
supporters of authoritarian rule, and anti-Europeans have been much more satisfied with
"their" champions – partly because they are, by definition, less demanding, and partly
also because the democrats didn't care so much to attract and keep their own supporters.
And from the mass of  the undecided,  most  have either gone to the Radicals  or  into
abstention rather than being drawn by the democrats.
50 In the conclusion to their recent book, two students of the Serbian political transition
argue that, in 2007, Serbia is an electoral democracy, which means a democracy indeed
(not an authoritarian or hybrid regime) but of an inferior kind19. It has not yet reached
the  level  of  liberal  or  constitutional  democracy.  In  addition,  it  is  neither  fully
consolidated nor in shambles, but instead "underconsolidated": it is functioning and the
danger of a possible return to the past ways is not imminent, but not fully ruled out
either.20 Democratic changes are visible and on the whole institutionalized, but are not
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absolutely irreversible. In the authors' opinion, the crucial and distinctive institution of
electoral democracy is (truly) free and fair elections; and precisely this is taken to be the
most  important  investment  for  the  future  democratic  development  of  Serbia:  "Free
elections,  as  long  as  their  outcomes  are  respected,  have  the  capacity  of  producing
political elites which each next time will build another brick into the democratic building,
eventually bringing about a consolidated democracy in Serbia"21. Let us hope the building
is erected and made to stand firm before another earthquake arrives.
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NOTES
1.  The  paper  is  part  of  the  research  project  “Social  Actors  and  Social  Change  in  Serbia
1990-2010”  (No.  149005),  of  the  Institute  of  Sociological  Research,  Faculty  of  Philosophy  in
Belgrade, supported by Ministry of Science of Serbia.
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2.  Here is a brief description of the three stages: 1) Stage One, hereafter referred to as "2002
study": 300 interviews conducted in 19 cities between November 2001 and February 2002; the
results published as: Golubović (Zagorka) et al., éds.,. Politika i svakodnevni život: Srbija 1999-2002
[Politics  and everyday life:  Serbia  1999-2002],  Beograd,  IFDT,.2003;  for  condensed findings  in
French see Spasić (Ivana), "Citoyens contre politiques: le 5 octobre 2000 et la construction de la
Serbie de l'après Milošević", Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 35, no. 1-2, mars-juin 2004:
269-295.; 2) "2005 Study": 30 interviews, 6 cities, February 2005, findings published in the special
section  of  the  journal  Filozofija  i  društvo (see  Golubović  (Zagorka),  "Rezultati  demokratske
tranzicije kroz prizmu građana Srbije 2005" [Results of democratic transition in the eyes of
Serbian citizens], Filozofija i društvo 2 (27): 13-44.; Spasić (Ivana), "Politika i svakodnevni život u
Srbiji  2005:  Odnos prema političkoj sferi,  promena društvenog poretka,  javnost" [Politics  and
everyday life in Serbia 2005: views of politics, change of the social system, the public sphere],
Filozofija i društvo, 2 (27), 2005, pp.45-74.; Jarić (Isidora), "U kandžama izneverenih očekivanja"
[In the claws of betrayed expectations], Filozofija i društvo 2 (27), 2005, pp.75-87. Also available
online:  http://www.doiserbia.nbs.bg.ac.yu/issue.aspx?issueid=194);  3)  "2007  Study":  100
interviews,  10  cities,  December  2006-January  2007,  published  as:  Golubović  (Zagorka),  éd.,.
Probuđene  nade  –  izneverena  očekivanja  [Awakened  hopes  –  betrayed  expectations],  Beograd,
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2007.
3.  Such opinions were by no means rare in 2002 interviews, especially among older respondents.
4. Mihailović (Srećko), éd., Pet godina tranzicije u Srbiji II [Five years of transition in Serbia II],
Beograd: Socijaldemokratski klub/FES, 2006, p.62.
5.  At that, it is somehow "forgotten" that the SRS was in power in the late 1990s, with disastrous
results. This forgetfulness may be ascribed to the combined effects of people’s strong focus on
surviving  in  the  present  moment  and  disregarding  everything  else,  and  of  successful  SRS
propaganda.
6. Golubović  (Zagorka),  "Angažovanost  građana  i  apstinencija  u  postoktobarskoj  Srbiji"
[Citizens' engagement and abstention in post-October Serbia], in Lutovac (Zoran), éd., Birači i
apstinenti u Srbiji, Beograd: FES/FPN/IDN, p.71.
7.  One should bear in mind though that the 2007 interviewees were extremely disillusioned and
critical by research design, as precisely such subjects were sought. But they may differ from the
average only in intensity or articulateness, not in the general mood, since the findings of other
surveys undertaken in the last years concur with ours. 
8. For  an  overview see  Stojanović  (Božo),  "Strana  ulaganja  –  stanje  i  perspektive"  [Foreign
investments  –  situation and prospects],  in:  M.  Đurković  (ed.),  Srbija  2000-2006:  država,  društvo,
privreda, Beograd: Institut za evropske studije, 2007, pp.171-198; Kontić (Ljiljana), "Privatizacija"
[Privatization], in Đurković (M.), éd., Srbija 2000-2006: država, društvo, privreda, Beograd: Institut za
evropske studije, 2007, pp.149-170.
9. Bogosavljević  (Srđan),  "Odnos birača prema drugim strankama i koalicijama" [Attitude of
voters toward other parties and coalitions],  in Lutovac (Zoran), éd., Birači  i  apstinenti  u Srbiji,
Beograd: FES/FPN/IDN, p.269.
10.  In  a  sense,  this  is  exactly  what  happened  in  the  'great  split'  of  2008  presidential  and
parliamentary elections (for better or for worse...).
11.  This symbolic dominance is interestingly illustrated by a 2001 poll. Anxious to show their
loyalty to the new government and the prevailing political climate, 70 % of respondents said they
had voted for DOS in the December 2000 republic elections. The problem is that this number is
larger than the total  voter  turnout in the same elections!  (see Logar (Svetlana),  "Vrednosne
orijentacije birača i apstinenata" [Value orientations of voters and abstainers], in Lutovac (Zoran),
éd., Birači i apstinenti u Srbiji, Beograd: FES/FPN/IDN, 2007, p.85.) Our data confirm the hegemony
of  the  "new spirit"  prevalent  throughout  society  in  2001-2002,  when even opponents  of  the
political change, as we saw, complied with its generally positive characterization. 
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12. Lutovac (Zoran), éd., Birači i apstinenti u Srbiji [Voters and abstainers in Serbia], Beograd: FES/
FPN/IDN,  2007,  especially  the  papers  by  Sajc,  Logar,  Ristić,  Vuković  and  Stoiljković.  It  is
remarkable that this is the second collective volume (in addition to ours) devoted to the same
topic that appeared in the same year. See also Slavujević  (Zoran),  Izborne kampanje:  pohod na
birače – slučaj Srbije od 1990. do 2007. godine [Election campaigns: fight for the voters, the case of
Serbia  1990-2007],  Beograd:  FES/FPN/IDN.,  2007;  Pantić  (Dragomir),  Pavlović  (Zoran),  Javno
mnenje: koncept i komparativna istraživanja [Public opinion: the concept and comparative research],
FES/IDN, 2007.
13. See Logar (Svetlana), "Vrednosne orijentacije birača i apstinenata" [Value orientations of voters
and abstainers], in Lutovac (Zoran), éd., Birači i apstinenti u Srbiji, Beograd: FES/FPN/IDN, 2007,
p.82.
14.  6.5 instead of about 5.5 million, according to CeSID estimates (Vuković 2007).
15. Sajc (Aleksandra),  "Izborni apstinenti protiv fasadne demokratije: prilozi za razumevanje
izbora u Srbiji" [Electoral abstainers against facade democracy: towards understanding elections
in Serbia], Nova srpska politička misao Vol. IX(1-4), 2002, pp.47-66.
16.  Democratic pro-European orientation: abstainers 55 % : voters 33 %; Pessimism: "Serbia is
heading in a bad direction" - abstainers agree in 74 %, voters in 41 %; "There is no future for
young people in Serbia" - 72 % : 47 %, respectively (Logar (Svetlana), "Vrednosne orijentacije
birača i apstinenata" [Value orientations of voters and abstainers], in Lutovac (Zoran), éd., Birači i
apstinenti u Srbiji, Beograd: FES/FPN/IDN, 2007, pp.89, 93, 94).
17.  DSS supporter has been found to lack any recognizable profile – differences within their
corpus are greater than differences between the averages of this group and the supporters of
other,  very diverse parties (Marković  (Vera),  "Promene vrednosnih orijentacija" [Changes in
value  orientations],  in  Mihailović  (Srećko),  éd.,  Pet  godina  tranzicije  u  Srbiji  II, Beograd:
Socijaldemokratski klub/FES, pp.219-227, p.224).
18.  Here  is  an  illustration:  in  2008 presidential  election,  the  candidate  DSS  endorsed,  their
coalition  partner  Velimir  Ilić,  won  only  7  percent.  Evidently,  most  DSS-tending  voters  split
between Nikolić and Tadić.
19. Pavlović (Dušan), Antonić (Slobodan), Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle 2000.
godine [Consolidation of democratic institutions in Serbia after 2000], Beograd: Službeni glasnik,
2007.
20.  The parallel with what I termed "low normalization" is striking. The difference is in the
analytic focus, not in substance.
21. Pavlović (Dušan), Antonić (Slobodan), Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle 2000.
godine [Consolidation of democratic institutions in Serbia after 2000], Beograd: Službeni glasnik,
2007, p.292.
ABSTRACTS
The aim of this paper is to indicate some trends in the changing political culture in Serbia from
the point of view of ordinary citizens. Discussions of political and economic transitions in Eastern
Europe have tended to privilege the top-down approach, presenting general outlines and macro-
processes.  This  paper  on  the  contrary  starts  from  the  assumption  that  this  must  be
complemented by a more bottom-up, fine-grained view that takes seriously what ordinary people
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think and say about what is going on. The choice is methodological and does not imply that what
citizens think is necessarily "correct" in cognitive or moral terms. There is just the belief that, in
a democracy, the real, living people, with all their virtues and vices, must be taken into account
since they are the true basis of any political processes and the source of their legitimacy.
L'objectif de cet article est d'indiquer certaines tendances dans l'évolution de la culture politique
en Serbie,  du  point  de  vue  des  citoyens  ordinaires.  Les  débats  sur  la  transition  politique  et
économique  en  Europe  de  l'Est  ont  eu  tendance  à  privilégier  l'approche  "top-down",  en
présentant  les  grandes  lignes  et  les  macro-processus.  Cet  article,  au  contraire,  part  de
l'hypothèse  que cela  doit  être  complété  par  une appoche du bas  vers  le  haut,  qui  prend en
compte  ce  que  les  gens  ordinaires  pensent  et  disent  de  ce  qui  se  passe.  Le  choix  est
méthodologique et n'implique pas que ce que pensent les citoyens est nécessairement "correct"
en termes cognitifs et moraux. Il y a juste la conviction que, dans une démocratie, les personnes
réelles et vivantes, avec toutes leurs vertus et leurs vices, doivent être prises en considération,
car elles sont le véritable fondement de tout processus politique et la source de leur légitimité.
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